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IF IT’S NOT RIPPED, WHY SEW IT? 
AN ANALYSIS OF WHY ENHANCED INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION FOR FASHION DESIGN IS IN POOR 
TASTE 
Kari Heyison
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine for a moment that some upstart revolutionary 
proposed that we eliminate all intellectual property 
protection for fashion design.  No longer could a de-
signer secure federal copyright protection for the cut 
of a dress or the sleeve of a blouse.  Unscrupulous 
mass-marketers could run off thousands of knock-off 
copies of any designer‘s evening ensemble, and flood 
the marketplace with cheap imitations of haute cou-
ture.  In the short run, perhaps, clothing prices would 
come down as legitimate designers tried to meet the 
prices of their free-riding competitors.  In the long run, 
though, as we know all too well, the diminution in the 
incentives for designing new fashions would take its 
toll.  Designers would still wish to design, at least in-
itially, but clothing manufacturers with no exclusive 
rights to rely on would be reluctant to make the in-
vestment involved in manufacturing those designs and 
distributing them to the public.  The dynamic Ameri-
can fashion industry would wither, and its most ta-
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.  Special thanks to 
Professor Seplowitz for all of your support and guidance throughout this process.  Also, to 
my fashion guru, best friend and mom who instilled in me a love of fashion at a young age.  
Thank you for your support and love throughout the years.  You are my inspiration.  And to 
Joe, you truly have made my life complete.  Thank you for everything.  I love you with all of 
my heart. 
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lented designers would forsake clothing design for 
some more remunerative calling like litigation.  All of 
us would be forced either to wear last year‘s garments 
year in and year out, or to import our clothing from 
abroad. 
. . . . 
          Of course, we don‘t give copyright protection to 
fashions . . . .  We never have.1 
The goal of intellectual property law is to encourage innova-
tion among creators by protecting the expression of their ideas and 
giving them property rights in what they produce.2  However, what if 
creators are innovative without that protection?  What if the industry 
seeking to be protected is a $350 billion dollar industry in America 
alone3 and has continued to rapidly grow and thrive despite the ab-
sence of protection for fashion designs?  If the purpose of intellectual 
property protection holds no water in a given industry, should intel-
lectual property protection be afforded?  What if enhanced intellec-
tual property protection would alternatively inhibit innovation and 
creativity?  Should we still fight for it? 
This Comment demonstrates how the current intellectual 
property protections which are in place in the fashion industry are 
more than sufficient and how increased protections will stunt the in-
dustry‘s growth, hurting both high and low-end designers, society, 
and the economy.  Additionally, increased protection may eventually 
cause a divide in society between the upper and middle/lower social 
classes, the likes of which the country is not prepared to face or han-
dle. 
This Comment focuses solely on ―knock-offs,‖ which are 
low-cost imitations of original designs.4  Knock-offs do not violate 
any law currently in place in the United States.  In fact, some stores 
make their living by providing inspired or low-cost imitations of an 
original design to the masses who wish to fit in and be ―in style,‖ but 
 
1 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 105-06 (2001). 
2 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN & R. ANTHONY REESE, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND 
RELATED STATE DOCTRINES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 17 (Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 6th ed. 2008). 
3 Kimberly Ann Barton, Back to the Beginning: A Revival of a 1913 Argument for 
Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion Design, 35 J. CORP. L. 425, 427 (2009). 
4 See Sarl Louis Feraud Int‘l v. Viewfinder Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 123, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
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who cannot afford the original creation.5  Trademark law current pro-
tects the fashion industry against counterfeit goods.6  Accordingly, 
this Comment does not remark on the use of counterfeit marks which, 
as will be discussed later, are already illegal in the United States.  
Counterfeiting is stealing a protected piece of property,7 an act which 
harms the fashion industry and should be prohibited.  It is not my po-
sition to decrease the protections that are currently in place, only to 
inhibit the enhancement of further protection. 
Part II of this Comment focuses on the current so-called ―li-
mited‖ state of intellectual property protection in the fashion industry, 
proposed expansions, and why those expansions are problematic.  
Part III focuses on other countries‘ protections of fashion designs and 
why those laws do little to protect the industry.  Part IV depicts what 
the United States would look like in a world without ―knock-offs.‖  
Part V examines other industries which have not been afforded en-
hanced intellectual property protection and how those industries have 
thrived.  Finally, Part VI concludes that the current state of intellec-
tual property law in the fashion industry is sufficient to ensure the 
continued growth and innovation currently present within the $350 
billion dollar industry that is fashion.  After all, one would not take a 
perfectly good shoe to a shoemaker to have it mended if it did not 
need mending.  The result would either be (a) the same shoe or (b) an 
inferior version of the good shoe you originally brought in.  So why 
are designers and their supporters attempting to fix something that is 
not broken?  The fashion industry is a growing, thriving, multi-billion 
dollar industry and does not need to be fixed. 
 
 
5 See generally Irene Tan, Knock It Off, Forever 21! The Fashion Industry’s Battle 
Against Design Piracy, 18 J.L. & POL‘Y 893, 901 (2010) (―Meanwhile, many retailers have 
created a profitable living ‗knocking off‘ designers.  For example, Forever 21, a Fortune 500 
company, is considered by some as the ‗most notorious copyist retailer‘ and is the target of 
over fifty lawsuits for copyright and trademark infringement.‖). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1) (Supp. II 2008) (―Whoever . . . uses a counterfeit mark on or 
in connection with . . . goods or services . . . knowing that a counterfeit mark has been 
applied thereto, the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive, 
shall . . . be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .‖). 
7 See Brian M. Hoffstadt, Dispossession, Intellectual Property, and the Sin of 
Theoretical Homogeneity, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 909, 958 (2007). 
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND WHY THE 
PROPOSED ENHANCEMENT WOULD NOT WORK 
The fashion ―design‖ as a whole is unprotected in the United 
States under the current state of the law.8  However, aspects of that 
design may be safeguarded under existing intellectual property pro-
tections.9  Over the past hundred years, several attempts have been 
made to extend what was already in place to protect fashion and the 
design as a whole.10  Unfortunately for those who are in favor of ex-
panding protection, these attempts have been repeatedly shot down.11  
The design of a garment remains unprotected in copyright for one 
main reason: the expression of the design serves a utilitarian rather 
than an artistic purpose.12  However, designers may utilize existing 
protections to protect parts of their designs, although not to the extent 
sought by many in the fashion community.  The three main areas of 
protection which designers can seek refuge in are patent,13 trademark 
(and trade dress),14 and copyright.15  The following section takes a 
brief look at the history of fashion    design protection, the current 
protections, and why proposed enhancement will not work given the 
nature of the industry. 
A. History 
Designers have been fighting for design protection for almost 
a century.16  With the failure of attempts to enact federal laws to pro-
tect their designs, designers decided to take matters into their own 
hands and self-regulate the fashion industry from within by forming 
 
8 Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s 
Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 935 (2010). 
9 Barton, supra note 3, at 431. 
10  See generally id. at 429 (noting that the Fashion Originators‘ Guild of America 
(FOGA) who attempted to form ―alliances with retailers who agreed not to sell copied 
designs‖ were stopped by the Supreme Court; and the ―Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
abolished the Millinery Creators‘ Guild,‖ another organization who lobbied for design 
protection without offering the designers any relief for their designs being copied). 
11 See id. 
12 See 17 U.S.C. § 1302(4) (1999); Kristin L. Black, Crimes of Fashion: Is Imitation 
Truly the Sincerest Form of Flattery?, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 505, 507 (2010). 
13 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
14 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (2006). 
15 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2006). 
16 See Barton, supra note 3, at 429. 
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the Fashion Originator‘s Guild of America (―The Guild‖).17  In 1932, 
fifteen designers formed a coalition which registered its members‘ fa-
shion designs and formed agreements ―with retailers who agreed not 
to sell [‗knock-off‘ or] copied designs‖ that were registered.18  The 
Guild‘s efforts were stopped when the Supreme Court found that the 
Guild was engaging in behavior which limited competition and vi-
olated the Sherman Antitrust Act.19  With the Guild‘s efforts halted, 
the industry was once again subject to design piracy with no federal 
laws to prevent such conduct.  Almost one hundred years later, al-
though some aspects of designs may be protected, the industry is crit-
icized by designers for remaining largely unprotected when it comes 
to fashion design as a whole.20 
B. Patent 
The purpose of a patent is to provide to a creator an incentive 
to create by offering the possibility of a reward.21  A patent can be 
used to protect ―any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or de-
vice, or any improvement therein not before known or used.‖22  Pa-
tent law imposes the strictest requirements for the creator and, as 
such, is the hardest type of protection to obtain.23  To acquire a pa-
tent, the invention/design must meet three requirements: (1) non-
 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
[A]n intent to increase prices is not an ever-present essential of conduct 
amounting to a violation of the policy of the Sherman and Clayton Acts; 
a monopoly contrary to their policies can exist even though a combina-
tion may temporarily or even permanently reduce the price of the articles 
manufactured or sold.  For as this Court has said, ―Trade or commerce 
under those circumstances may nevertheless be badly and unfortunately 
restrained by driving out of business the small dealers and worthy men 
whose lives have been spent therein, and who might be unable to read-
just themselves to their altered surroundings.  Mere reduction in the price 
of the commodity dealt in might be dearly paid for by the ruin of such a 
class and the absorption of control over one commodity by an allpower-
ful combination of capital.‖ 
Fashion Originators‘ Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm‘n, 312 U.S. 457, 467 (1941). 
20 See Dan Hunter, Fashion Designers Still Patiently Awaiting the Passage of the 
IDPPPA, New York Law School (June 15, 2011), http://www.caseclothesed.com/fashion-
designers-still-patiently-awaiting-the-passage-of-the-idpppa/. 
21 GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 2, at 25. 
22 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3242 (2010). 
23 Barton, supra note 3, at 431-32. 
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obviousness, (2) novelty, and (3) utility.24  There are two types of pa-
tents: utility and design.25  Utility patents protect the functional as-
pects of an article while design patents protect the overall look.26  In 
the fashion industry, a design patent is what the designer seeks.  To 
obtain a design patent, the designer must show ―novelty, non [-] ob-
viousness, ornamentality, and non-functionality.‖27  This is where the 
designer runs into a problem.  First, an article of clothing is inherent-
ly functional; it serves the purpose of covering the body, and while 
aspects of that article such as a peculiar color which serves no func-
tional purpose or an ornamental embellishment on a sleeve may be 
able to obtain a design patent, the design as a whole cannot.28  More-
over, to construct a design which is non-obvious is next to impossible 
given the nature of the fashion industry.  What has not already been 
created?  One would have to create a completely new type of cloth-
ing; and unless the public is in the market for a fingernail warmer, 
one can imagine how difficult that would be. 
Additionally, the process of obtaining a patent is extremely 
lengthy, not to mention expensive.29  On average, it takes the Patent 
and Trademark Office (―PTO‖) over two years to review each appli-
cation, and almost a quarter of the applications are rejected.30  Given 
the nature of the fashion industry‘s ―here today, gone tomorrow‖ 
mentality, a trend or style can come and go long before the PTO 
 
24 Julie P. Tsai, Fashion Protection: A Note on the Protection of Fashion Design in the 
United States, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 447, 455 (2005). 
25 Tsai, supra note 24, at 455. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Black, supra note 12, at 507 (―In [a] heated ski jacket example . . . a design 
patent could be obtained to protect any separate, ornamental, non-functional (non-heating) 
aspects of the jacket such as a decorative rosette on the collar, but the overall design of a 
jacket shape could not be the subject of a design patent because that shape is dictated by its 
function.‖). 
29 Tsai, supra note 24, at 457-58. 
[T]he high costs of obtaining design patents would make it difficult for 
an individual designer or small business to acquire protection for its en-
tire collection.  The designer would necessarily require the assistance of 
a patent lawyer during the long process of searching the prior art in addi-
tion to the fees required by the United States Patent and Trademark Of-
fice (USPTO).  The filing fee for a design patent application is currently 
$310 and if the patent is issued there is an additional fee of $430 for each 
design patent issued.  Further, in 2003, attorneys charged a median fee of 
$1,100 per design patent application for preparing and filing the patent. 
Id. at 457. 
30 Id. 
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renders a decision on the application.31  Moreover, patent protection 
would only be an option to protect established fashion designers or 
fashion houses because of the extreme expense which arises from  
obtaining a patent.32  If a designer could manage to overcome the 
enormously high burden of proving that his or her collection is novel, 
non-obvious and non-functional, after attorneys‘ fees, a designer 
could end up paying over $20,000 to protect any given collection.33 
Finally, a design patent protects a design for fourteen years.34  
This amount of protection is absurd given the fast moving pace of the 
industry.  This means that no designers are able to take advantage of 
another designer‘s creation for over a decade, and by that time, the 
design will likely be essentially useless to the copying designer.  Pro-
tecting a design for this excessive amount of time would create a mo-
nopoly over a fashion design, limiting competition and in turn hurting 
consumers and retailers alike.  The purpose of a patent is to incentiv-
ize creativity and to increase innovation.35  Protecting fashion design 
through patent has the opposite effect and decreases innovation 
among designers by forcing them to wait an unwarranted and unprec-
edented amount of time to take advantage of new and innovative    
designs.  If a designer could even pass the threshold required to ob-
tain a design patent, such an occurrence would cause tremendous 
harm in the industry by stifling creativity in other designers -- and it 
would stifle it for fourteen years. 
While patent protection for fashion design is available, it is 
next to impossible to attain and is unrealistic given the cost and 
length of the process as well as the devastating effects it would cause 
if it was widely used.  Nevertheless, for truly novel and original artis-
tic creations, it is an available tool that the designers can utilize to 
protect their designs. 
C. Trademark and Trade Dress 
Arguably, the most useful protection available to designers is 
that offered under trademark and trade dress law.  A trademark refers 
 
31 See id. at 457-58. 
32 See id. at 457. 
33 Tsai, supra note 24, at 457 (―[I]t would cost a designer with . . . [ten] articles of 
clothing in her collection nearly $20,000 to apply for and obtain protection for her collection, 
including attorney fees.‖). 
34 Id. 
35 See Goldstein and Reese, supra note 2, at 17. 
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to: 
any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used by a per-
son, or . . . which a person has a bona fide intention to 
use in commerce and applies to register . . . to identify 
and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique 
product, from those manufactured or sold by others 
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that 
source is unknown.36 
The mark must be distinctive.37  That is, a mark must be ―(1) inhe-
rently distinctive or (2) have obtained distinctiveness by way of ac-
quiring a secondary meaning.‖38  This type of protection prohibits 
other designers from creating counterfeit goods.  When a designer af-
fixes a trademark upon the article or design, his or her design is the-
reby protected against infringers who try to pass off their articles as 
those of the originator.  Imagine the following: Nike, a famous  ath-
letic apparel company, creates a black t-shirt and affixes its trade-
marked logo, the famous Nike Swoosh, on the shirt.  This shirt is  
protected because the logo on the shirt is protected.39  When Compa-
ny B comes along and creates a black t-shirt, he or she is precluded 
from creating consumer confusion by affixing a substantially similar 
mark on the black t-shirt.  Nike is protected and Company B can still 
flourish creating black t-shirts even though Nike came out with the 
black t-shirt idea first.  This type of protection is more than adequate 
for the fashion industry.  Those who are in the market for and wish to 
buy the name brand for prestige and recognition will buy the Nike 
shirt, but those who cannot afford a black Nike t-shirt and do not feel 
so inclined to have the name brand can still have access to Company 
B‘s design at a lower cost.  This practice stimulates the economy and 
allows for innovation and creativity to flourish in the industry.40  The 
creator (Nike) reaps the benefits of its design, and the public can easi-
ly identify which design is the original and which design is simply an 
inspired imitation.  Then, consumers can make their decision on 
 
36 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
37 Lisa J. Hedrick, Tearing Fashion Design Protection Apart at the Seams, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 215, 225 (2008). 
38 Id. at 225. 
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
40 See Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) (―Congress sanctioned . . . monopoly power to reward and encourage originality and 
creativity in otherwise competitive markets.‖). 
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which shirt to buy based on their needs and means.  All the designer 
needs to do to assert trademark protection is register its trademark.41 
Not only is a designer protected from other designers using an 
exact trademark, but a designer who registers a trademark is further 
protected from another designer‘s using a similar mark which may 
cause a likelihood of consumer confusion.  In McGregor-Doniger 
Inc. v. Drizzle Inc.,42 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that Drizzle Inc. could produce a raincoat affixed 
with the logo ―Drizzle‖ even though McGregor had already produced 
and registered the mark ―Drizzler‖ for a golf jacket because no like-
lihood of confusion existed.43  This case provides for the occasion, 
however, that when consumer confusion is likely, a cause of action 
will exist for the original designer.44  In making the determination as 
to whether consumer confusion will likely exist, the McGregor-
Doniger court applied the following criteria known as the ―Polaroid 
Factors‖: distinctiveness of the mark, similarity of the marks, product 
proximity, quality of defendant‘s product, likelihood of the plaintiff‘s 
entry into the defendant‘s market, evidence of actual confusion, the 
defendant‘s good faith, and the sophistication of the buyers.45 
Trademark provides a great deal of protection for certain 
types of designs when there is a logo affixed to them and protects the 
designers from others using the logo or anything substantially similar 
that would lead to a consumer being confused.  However, many de-
signers believe that trademark protection is inadequate to protect the 
design as a whole.46 
While trademark refers to a symbol or a name affixed to the 
article, trade dress offers protection to the overall look and feel of a 
non-functional product.47  Moreover it protects the consumer‘s per-
ception of the product.  This includes the protection of features ―such 
as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even 
particular sales techniques.‖48  In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
 
41 Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 468 (1914). 
42 599 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir. 1979), superseded by rule, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). 
43 Id. at 1139. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1130 (citing Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 
1961)). 
46 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 20. 
47 Taco Cabana Int‘l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1991), 
aff'd sub nom., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
48 Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765 n.1 (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, 
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1981)). 
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Brothers, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court explicitly stated that this type of 
safeguard protects designs which are non-functional and have ac-
quired a secondary meaning50 and also unregistered marks which 
have acquired secondary meaning when they are so closely asso-
ciated with the product that consumer confusion is likely to occur.51  
In Wal-Mart, Samara Brothers sued Wal-Mart for trade dress in-
fringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging that Wal-
Mart ―knocked-off‖ Samara Brothers‘ design when it created and 
sold, at a significantly lower price, a line of children‘s clothing which 
consisted of one-piece seer-sucker outfits adorned with appliqués of 
flowers, fruits, and hearts.52  The Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court‘s decision and held that Samara Brothers could only prevail 
upon a showing that its seer-sucker design had established a second-
ary meaning, which means that ― ‗in the minds of the public, the pri-
mary significance of a mark [or design] is to identify the source of 
the product rather than the product itself.‘ ‖53 
Trade dress will be protected only when the ―size, shape, col-
or or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales 
techniques‖54 identifies a source and not just the product itself.55  A 
designer who meets the requirements can sue for infringement under 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), which provides a civil cause of action for de-
signers against ―[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any 
goods . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof‖ that is likely to cause consumer 
confusion as to the source.56  Trade dress has been criticized as not 
providing sufficient protection for designers;57 however it is precisely 
the type of protection which designers seek: protection of the whole 
 
49 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
50 Id. at 216. 
51 Id. at 215; Kevin V. Tu, Counterfeit Fashion: The Interplay Between Copyright and 
Trademark Law in Original Fashion Designs and Designer Knockoffs, 18 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 419, 433 (2010). 
52 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 207-08. 
53 Id. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 
(1982)). 
54 John H. Harland Co., 711 F.2d at 980. 
55 See generally Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765 (noting that ―[t]he ‗trade dress‘ of a 
product is essentially its total image and overall appearance‖ of the brand and not simply the 
product itself (quoting Blue Bell Bio-Med. v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 
1989))). 
56 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006). 
57 See generally George Likourezos, When Trade Dress Protection May Not Be 
Enough: Two Recent Case Studies, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 439 (1998). 
10
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design—its look and its feel.  True, the burden of acquiring second-
ary meaning is a lofty one; however with proper advertising and in-
novation, it is far from unattainable.58 
In view of the fact that trademark law offers the most protec-
tion to designers and because it offers protection for the overall de-
sign so long as it has acquired a secondary meaning, several recent 
attempts to expand these protections have occurred.59  Because no 
protection has been afforded in copyright for the overall design, de-
signers have become creative in an attempt to further protect their de-
signs by expanding trademark or trade dress law. 
In a recent law review article, The New Black: Trademark 
Protection for Color Marks in the Fashion Industry,60 Sunila Stree-
pada suggests that trademark law could be expanded to color marks.61  
Color marks may be able to offer a design trade dress or trademark 
protection if they are effectively advertised, marketed, and in turn ac-
quire secondary meaning.62  In Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products 
Co., Inc.,63 the Supreme Court held that a color could be registered as 
a trademark so long as it has acquired a secondary meaning, identifies 
and distinguishes the brand, and is not used for a functional pur-
pose.64  In the above case, the Court allowed Qualitex to register a 
special shade of green-gold for its dry cleaning press pads.65  Howev-
er, to allow companies to assert trademark protection by registering a 
 
58 Examples of designers who have acquired trade dress protection through acquisition 
of secondary meaning by effective advertising and reputation are Tiffany and Co., for its teal 
blue box and white ribbon, and Christian Louboutin, for its distinctive and innovative red 
soled shoe: 
Christian Louboutin, shoemaker to the stars, uses a signature red-colored 
sole to distinguish its products.  Louboutin was recently successful in 
proving the acquired distinctiveness of its red soles and securing a U.S. 
registration for its red sole trademark . . . .  Even prior to that, Louboutin 
was enforcing its rights in red-soled shoes against others using a similar 
design [through trade dress protection]. 
Michelle Mancino Marsh, et al., Footwear IP Protection and Litigation on the Rise, KENYON 
(Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.kenyon.com/newspublications/publications/2009/02-01.aspx.  
But see Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
59 See Barton, supra note 3, at 429. 
60 Sunila Streepada, The New Black: Trademark Protection for Color Marks in the 
Fashion Industry, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1131 (2009). 
61 Id. at 1133. 
62 Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211; Marsh, supra note 58. 
63 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
64 Id. at 161. 
65 Id. 
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particular color will, with certainty, eventually prove detrimental to 
the industry, creating monopolies over colors that are an absolute ne-
cessity and a functional component of a design.  We may have an in-
flux of designers asserting that a color is theirs, going out and regis-
tering that color, and thereby exhausting the available colors that 
designers can use.66  Additionally, given the nature of the fashion in-
dustry, associating one‘s brand with one color may not be practical 
due to designers‘ changing colors seasonally to keep up in the indus-
try.67 
This type of protection is available now for fashion designers 
to protect an aspect of their design (the color).68  Eventually, howev-
er, if designers keep registering colors as trademarks the functionality 
doctrine will bar this available option because with a lack of colors to 
choose from, the color will move from a distinguishing mark to a ne-
cessary element which proves functional.69  The Supreme Court‘s 
discussion of the ―color depletion theory‖70 may justify the register-
ing of color as a trademark for some industries where color is not a 
functional aspect, but merely a distinguishing mark.  However, in the 
fashion context, it would prove to be unfavorable.  The Supreme 
Court‘s discussion in Qualitex is inadequate when applied to the fa-
shion industry.  Trademarking colors in the fashion industry would 
―significantly hinder competition‖71 in an industry where color is a 
fundamental and functional feature. 
 
66 See Streepada, supra note 60, at 1141. 
However, colors used in fashion designs are often considered seasonal--
earth tones for fall, jewel tones for holidays, pastels for spring and 
whites for summer.  As a result, there are limited colors that consumers 
identify with all seasons.  The colors used as marks may be limited to 
those colors to blend with the consumer‘s seasonal wardrobe, as well as 
the designer‘s seasonal collection.  If a designer varied the color accord-
ing to the season to be compatible with the seasonal palette, no color 
would become identified with the brand to provide the distinctiveness 
sought by the designer. 
Id. at 1156. 
67 Id. 
68 See generally id. 
69 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169 (―The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the 
use of a product‘s feature as a trademark where doing so will put a competitor at a 
significant disadvantage because the feature is ‗essential to the use or purpose of the article‘ 
or ‗affects [its] cost or quality.‘ ‖ (quoting Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 850 n.10)). 
70 Id. at 169-70. 
71 Id. at 170. 
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D. Copyright 
Fashion designers have been trying for years to obtain copy-
right protection for their designs to no avail.72  Copyright protection 
would ―offer[ ] the most protection,‖ but currently ―is extremely   li-
mited.‖73  Section 102 of the Copyright Act74 provides that copyright 
protection extends to ―original works of authorship fixed in any tang-
ible medium.‖75  The problem for designers arises because this type 
of protection does not extend to ―useful articles,‖76 a category which 
encompasses clothing designs.77  Because clothing articles are inhe-
rently ―functional‖ and serve the utilitarian purpose of covering the 
body, it is extremely difficult for designers to seek refuge in   copy-
right protection because the hurdle they must jump through to prove 
that their design is ―non-functional‖ is exceedingly high.  Currently, 
the only way designers can acquire copyright protection for their de-
sign is to use the ―separability test‖ which developed from Mazer v. 
Stein.78  In Mazer, the Supreme Court extended copyright protection 
for designs when the ―non-functional‖ aspect of the design could be 
separated from the ―functional‖ aspect and as such allowed the de-
signer of a lamp to copyright the statuette, which formed the base of 
an inherently functional lamp.79  After this case was decided, Con-
gress enacted the ―separability test‖ which has allowed for the copy-
right of  ― ‗pictorial, graphic, or sculptural‘ features of a design . . . 
[provided that] those features are physically or conceptually separa-
ble from the useful features of the product.‖80  Despite the fact that      
designers can use the separability test to copyright a ―non-functional‖ 
aspect of their design, the design as a whole remains largely unpro-
tected.  This need for designs to be protected has recently resulted in 
many failed attempts to extend copyright protection to fashion design 
 
72 See Barton, supra note 3, at 429. 
73 Biana Borukhovich, Comment, Fashion Design: The Work of Art that is Still 
Unrecognized in the United States, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 155, 164 (2009). 
74 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. § 101. 
77 Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm‘t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 916 n.12 (2010) (―Human clothing 
is considered utilitarian and unprotectable.‖). 
78 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
79 Id. at 217-19. 
80 Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why Congress Should Adopt a Modified 
Version of the Design Piracy Prohibition Act, 14 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 305, 315 (2007) (quoting 
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
13
Heyison: If It's Not Ripped, Why Sew It?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
268 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
as a whole.81 
 
E. The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy 
Prevention Act 
The most recent effort to copyright fashion design was intro-
duced by Senator Charles Schumer.82  The bill is artfully entitled the 
―Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act‖ 
(―IDPPPA‖ or ―The Act‖).83  This new bill is derived from a long line 
of failed Design Piracy Prohibition Acts (―DPPA‖) with slight altera-
tions.84  The main difference between the older versions of the DPPA 
and the newer version, the IDPPPA, is that the IDPPPA would      
protect only non-functional ― ‗unique‘ designs‖ which are classified 
as those which are ―truly new and distinguishable.‖85  Additionally, 
the Act provides that ―only ‗substantially identical‘ copies would be‖ 
subject to infringement actions.86  A design is considered ―substan-
tially identical‖ when the article of apparel is ―so similar in appear-
ance as to be likely to be mistaken for the protected design, and con-
tains only those differences in construction or design which are 
merely trivial.‖87  Moreover, some minor modifications exist such as: 
home sewers being free to make knock-offs for their own personal 
use; the plaintiff having the burden of proving the necessary ele-
ments; and elimination of the requirement to register the designs with 
the copyright office.88  Aside from the difficulties in passing a bill 
such as the IDPPPA, the effects on the industry and on the economy 
 
81 See Barton, supra note 3, at 429. 
82 Louis S. Ederer & Maxwell Preston, The Innovative Design Protection and Piracy 
Prevention Act: Fashion Industry Friend or Faux? (Aug. 28, 2010), http://www.lexisnexis 
.com/community/copyright-trademarklaw/blogs/fashionindustrylaw/archive/2010/08/25/the-
innovative-design-protection-and-piracy-prevention-act-fashion-industry-friend-or-
faux.aspx. 
83 Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Why Imitation is the Sincerest Form of 
Fashion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A23; S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) 
(reintroduced to Congress on July 13, 2011, as H.R. 2511, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011)). 
84 See generally Barton, supra note 3, at 427. 
85 Raustiala & Sprigman, Why Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Fashion, supra note 
83. 
86 Id. 
87 S. 3728, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010).  Non-trivial differences are to be considered 
in determining if a defendant‘s design is not substantially identical to an original design.  Id. 
88 Staci Riordan, Breaking News: New Design Piracy Bill Introduced Into Senate, 
FASHION LAW BLOG (Aug. 6, 2010), http://fashionlaw.foxrothschild.com/2010/08/articles/ 
design-piracy-prohibition-act/breaking-news-new-design-piracy-bill-introduced-into-senate/. 
14
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would be devastating.89  The multitude of problems presented by this 
bill will prevent the accomplishment of its goals should it be enacted. 
First, the stringent standard that the IDPPPA requires for 
uniqueness of a design is too difficult for a plaintiff to successfully 
plead because what design is truly unique (that is, truly new and 
distinguishable)?90  Further, to leave the interpretation of when a 
fashion design is unique in the hands of a judge who is learned in the 
law, but not so in fashion design, is dangerous to say the least.91  
Additionally, if a design is able to pass the high threshold of 
constituting a truly unique design, protection should already be 
available for it through a design patent.92  Furthermore, because this 
bill requires no registration, designers and retailers alike could be 
held liable for infringing upon a design of which they had no notice 
even existed.93  Lastly, the definition of ―substantially identical‖ as 
―an article of apparel . . . which is so similar in appearance as to like-
ly be mistaken for the protected designs,‖ (which other designers 
have no notice of), ―and contains only those differences in construc-
tion or designing which are merely trivial‖94 is so vague and unclear 
that it would be almost impossible for a plaintiff to prove it and for a 
judge to interpret it to afford meaningful protection. 
Staci Riordan of Fox Rothschild LLP foresees that the enact-
ment of the IDPPPA will do nothing more than create frivolous law-
suits by designers, which will in turn increase the already high prices 
that the consumer must pay for apparel.  Even designers who bring 
non-frivolous cases will not prevail because the threshold they must 
overcome is too high.95  Further, she puts it best when she states, 
―[a]s a practicing fashion lawyer, litigator, former [Chief Operating 
Officer] of apparel companies and the fourth generation of my family 
to work in fashion, law professors and politicians with no hands-on 
fashion industry experience should not be allowed to ‗fix‘ something 
that they have no practical knowledge of.‖96 
 
 
89 See id.; see infra, Part IV. 
90 See Riordan, supra note 88. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. (referring to the plain language of the Bill). 
95 Riordan, supra note 88. 
96 Id. 
15
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III. OTHER COUNTRIES: A LOOK AT WHY THE PROTECTIONS IN 
PLACE ARE LESS THAN FASHIONABLE 
The United States is often criticized for being one of the only 
industrialized countries that does not afford adequate intellectual 
property protection to its designers.97  Therefore, it is important to 
look at the countries which do afford intellectual property protection 
to their designers and determine whether those protections effectively 
circumvent design ―piracy‖ practices.98  This discussion must include 
an examination of intellectual property protections provided to fa-
shion designs by the European Union‘s Community Design System 
and Japan. 
A. The European Union’s Community Design System 
The European Union protects fashion design under what is 
known as the Community Design System (―CDS‖).99  Under this sys-
tem, a design is defined as ―[t]he outward appearance of a product or 
part of it, resulting from the lines, contours, colours, shape, texture, 
materials, and/or its ornamentation.‖100  Like the IDPPPA, the CDS 
requires a showing of ―novelty‖ and ―individual character‖ for pro-
tection.101  However, the standard appears to be more like an original-
ity standard than a novelty one.102  Similar to the IDPPPA, under the 
CDS, registration of the design is not required; however, if a designer 
chooses not to register a design, it is only protected for three years 
compared to the maximum of twenty-five years of protection af-
forded to registered designs.103  Once registered, the CDS gives the 
designer ―exclusive use of the design and ability to prevent unautho-
rized parties from using the design.‖104  All things considered, it ap-
pears as though the IDPPPA aspires to emulate the CDS with minor 
 
97 See Hedrick, supra note 37, at 216-20. 
98 See infra, Part III, Section A. 
99 See Hedrick, supra note 37, at 248-52. 
100  Id. at 248; see Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market, General Question: 
Question 1.1, OAMI, http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/ RCD/FAQ/ RCD1.en.do#100 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011) [hereinafter FAQs on the Community Design]. 
101  Hedrick, supra note 37, at 248. 
102  Id. at 249 (―No other ‗identical design‘ is available to the public at the time of 
registration or when the article is made public.‖). 
103  Id. at 249. 
104  Id. at 249-50 (noting that unregistered designs only receive these rights if they were 
copied). 
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differences.105  Interestingly enough, while the IDPPPA aspires to 
emulate the provisions of the CDS, it presumably does not seek to 
reach the same outcome.  This is because, under the CDS, designs are 
still frequently copied.106 
In their law review article entitled ―The Piracy Paradox,‖ au-
thors Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman demonstrate how, de-
spite the intellectual property protections available in Europe, 
―knocking-off‖ designs still occurs with fervor.107  They note that 
―two of the major fashion copyists—H&M and Zara—are European 
firms that expanded to North America only after substantial success 
at home.‖108  Furthermore, these companies have been successfully 
sued for infringements less than a handful of times.109  As such, these 
authors conclude that ―if expanded design protection were helpful to 
designers in Europe, [they] would expect to see the existing law used 
and many more infringement suits brought‖ against companies such 
as H&M and Zara.110 
Additionally, a look at the practice of registering copyrighta-
ble designs in Europe shows that nearly identical designs are able to 
be registered.111  If the threshold for registration of these nearly iden-
tical designs is so low, ―then the protection conferred is virtually 
meaningless.‖112  It seems as though ―everything short of an exact 
replication of an existing design would be a new design and thus le-
gal.‖113  What is the purpose of an intellectual property protection 
scheme for fashion designs, which in practice does not afford protec-
tion?  The CDS of the European Union shows that there is no pur-
pose.  Implementing a senseless intellectual property scheme in a 
country as litigious as the United States would be a disastrous waste 
of time, money, and resources.  This is a task that our already over-
burdened court system is not prepared to deal with. 
 
105 See, e.g., id. at 250-52 (noting that the IDPPPA provides three years protection for 
registered or unregistered designs; registration time period requirements differ; and the CDS 
declines to protect designs which ―are against public policy or morality,‖ while the IDPPPA 
does not). 
106 See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1737 (2006). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 1740 (referring to ―the paucity of lawsuits in Europe‖). 
110 Id. at 1759. 
111 See Hedrick, supra note 37, at 256-57 (noting that Nike registered designs are 
substantially similar in appearance with little to no variance). 
112 Id. at 257. 
113 Id. 
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B. Japan 
While the European Union sets a standard for originality that 
is extremely low, Japan has taken the opposite approach.  Japan‘s   
requirement of novelty to protect a design under copyright closely re-
sembles the requirements necessary for obtaining a United States de-
sign patent.114  This extremely high novelty requirement allows for 
the protection of a fashion design only if ―[n]o identical or similar de-
sign‖ was ―in existence before the application was made,‖ essentially 
implying that the design must be completely new to the world.115  
Additionally, Japanese copyright law extends copyright protection to 
a design for twenty years.116  Even though Japan has given designers 
copyright protection, Japanese designers continue to complain about 
the lack of intellectual property protections afforded to their designs 
under the copyright law.117  Despite the enactment of copyright pro-
tection for fashion designs in Japan, fashion designers have not regis-
tered their designs in the Design Gazette.118  This begs the question: 
is there really an intellectual property scheme which, when imple-
 
114 Id. at 246-47. 
The novelty requirement under Japan‘s design law—―no identical or 
similar design‖ was ―in existence before the application was made; in 
other words, the design must be completely new‖–essentially mirrors the 
novelty standard in U.S. patent law.  Further, the ―ease of creation‖-
design must have creativity to be registered-and ―uniqueness‖-design 
cannot be similar to already existing designs, registered or not-standards 
resemble the ―nonobviousness‖ requirement in patent law.  The Japanese 
Design Protection system is also similar to U.S. patent protection in 
terms of registration and term of protection.  Japan‘s protection starts on 
the date of registration and lapses at the end of twenty years or upon the 
failure of the designer to pay an annual fee. 
Id. (quoting Japan External Trade Organization, Investing in Japan: § 5.7.1, JETRO, 
http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/laws/section5/page7.html (last visited Nov. 27, 
2011)). 
115 Hedrick, supra note 37, at 246-47 (quoting Japan External Trade Organization, 
Investing in Japan: § 5.7.1, JETRO, http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/setting_up/laws/section5 
/page7.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2011)). 
116 Id. at 247 (noting that copyright protection may also expire if the designer fails to 
pay the requisite annual fee). 
117 See Fashion Licensing Corner: Japanese Designers Need to Protect, Monetize 
Their Ideas, THE LICENSING LAW BLOG (Nov. 14, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://thelicensinglaw 
blog.com/ 2010/01/fashion-licensing-corner-japanese-designers-need-to-protect-monetize-
their-ideas. 
118 Hedrick, supra note 37, at 247 (―[I]t is doubtful that Japan‘s law offers real 
protection for fashion designs.  A cursory search of Japan‘s online Design Gazette, where 
registered designs are published, listed items such as . . . a plastic storage container with lid, 
a fish tank filter, a sink with moveable cooking stove . . . but no fashion designs.‖). 
18
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mented, would satisfy designers? 
While supporters of increased intellectual property protections 
for fashion design argue that the United States lags behind other 
countries in regard to these protections,119 the experience in these 
countries must be examined to determine if their protections are even 
accomplishing what those supporters claim.  A look at two of the 
most popular intellectual property schemes for fashion design (the 
EU and Japan) demonstrates that fashion is just one of those indus-
tries that can be protected on paper but not in practice. 
IV. A WORLD WITHOUT KNOCK-OFFS? 
In theory, a world without knock-offs sounds wonderful.  De-
signers would be able to create and monopolize designs throughout 
the marketplace.  They would reap the fruit of their labors for three 
years and be able to relax on the beach until it was time for their cop-
yright to expire and for them to create a new design which they could 
monopolize for another three years.  They would no longer need to be 
so quickly innovative in their ideas and instead would be able to mull 
over what their next great idea would be, perhaps improving upon it.  
The people who could afford these high-end designs would finally be 
able to feel the high class status that they so deserve while the lower 
classes, who do not have the means, would no longer be able to steal 
their thunder with low-quality knock-offs.  Thousands of stores 
which make their profits from knocking-off the high-end designers 
would finally go out of business, getting what they have deserved for 
so long.  And then we would wake up. 
Our economy depends on the ability of designers to ―knock-
off‖ each other‘s designs.  ―Knocking-off‖ or ―paying homage‖ to 
another designer‘s work is what propels the industry forward.  Not 
only does the practice avoid hurting designers, but it helps them, the 
industry, and our economy, which right now cannot afford to be hit 
with additional economic burdens. 
 
119 L.J. Jackson, Some Designers Say Their Work Deserves Copyright Protection; 
Others Say it Would Harm the Industry, ABA Law Journal, (July 1, 2011), http://www.aba 
journal. com/magazine/article/the_genuine_article/. 
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A. An Economic Analysis of Why Imitation is the 
Most Necessary Form of Fashion 
―Fast Fashion‖120 propels the industry forward by encouraging 
the ―high-end‖ or innovative designers to be even more innovative.121  
The more ―trend-focused‖ the consumers (and in turn ―fast-fashion‖ 
retailers) are, the more traditional retailers such as department stores 
must transform to reflect the needs of the consumers.122  This does  
little more than stimulate the struggling economy and propel the de-
signers to keep ahead of the trends by being creative.  So long as this 
cyclical nature of the fashion industry continues, the industry will 
continue to thrive and grow.  However, should the cyclical nature 
stop, which would be the case if the lower-end retailers were not     
allowed to imitate for the masses, the economy would suffer greatly. 
In their article, ―The Piracy Paradox,‖ Kal Raustiala and 
Christopher Sprigman show how ―induced-obsolescence‖ and      
―anchoring‖ are critical to the continued success of the fashion indus-
try.123  They discuss how the limited intellectual property protections 
are necessary for the rapid cyclical nature of the fashion industry to 
continue.124  Raustiala and Sprigman define clothing as a ―status-
conferring‖ and ―positional good.‖125  Positional goods are defined 
as: 
things that the Joneses buy.  Some things are bought 
 
120 Lauren Howard, An Uningenious Paradox: Intellectual Property Protections for 
Fashion Designs, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 333, 341-42 (2009) (referring to retailers whose 
business is to mass produce imitations of high-end designer pieces at a low-cost and 
presumably a reference to ―fast-food‖ retailers who produce lower-quality foods quickly and 
at a significantly lower price than their restaurant counterparts). 
121 See id. at 342-43. 
122 Id. at 342 (―Faced with more trend-focused competition, traditional department 
stores and retailers are transforming their own inventories to reflect . . . the recent runway 
collections.  Department stores have sped up their pace of production in order to compete.‖). 
123 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 106, at 1718-32. 
It is possible that the structure of the fashion cycle, and the industry‘s re-
lentless remixing and reworking of older (and current) designs, is endo-
genous, in that industry practices derive, in part, from the existing legal 
regime of open appropriation of designs.  To some degree this is clearly 
true: if fashion were treated like music or books by the law, the rework-
ing of designs might be quite limited.  It is unlikely, however, that the 
fashion cycle as a phenomenon would cease to exist under a high-
protection legal regime. 
Id. at 1734. 
124 Id. at 1718-33. 
125 Id. at 1718. 
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for their intrinsic usefulness, for instance, a hammer or 
a washing machine.  Positional goods are bought be-
cause of what they say about the person who buys 
them.  They are a way for a person to establish or sig-
nal their status relative to people who do not own 
them: fast cars, holidays in the most fashionable re-
sorts, clothes from trendy designers.126 
They go on to explain that the value given to a positional good is de-
fined by what society thinks about that particular good.127  They as-
sert that as more people possess a particular positional good, the desi-
rability and ―status symbol‖ it represents diminishes.128  As 
sociologist Georg Simmel put it, ―As fashion spreads, it gradually 
goes to its doom.‖129  It is clear that when a high-end designer creates 
a look or trend which is not protected heavily by intellectual property 
protection and a ―copy-cat‖ designer pays ―homage‖ to that look by 
creating a ―knock-off,‖ the look spreads, the exclusivity of the trend 
diminishes, and eventually the trend wears out.130  This cycle is what 
Raustiala and Sprigman call ―induced obsolescence.‖131  If copying 
designs were to become illegal through enhanced intellectual proper-
ty protections, the ―fashion cycle would occur very slowly.‖132  The 
slower the cycle occurs, the slower the money accrues due to in-
 
126 Id. 
127 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 106, at 1719 (―Positional 
goods purchases, consequently, are interdependent: what we buy is partially a function of 
what others buy.  Put another way, the value of a positional good arises in part from social 
context.‖). 
128 Id. (noting that the exclusivity of the good is a major part of its appeal). 
129 Id. (quoting Georg Simmel, Fashion, 10 INT‘L Q. 130, 138-39 (1904)); see also 
Simmel, supra at 138-39 (―The distinctiveness which in [the] early stages of a set fashion 
assures for it a certain distribution is destroyed as the fashion spreads, and as this element 
wanes, the fashion also is bound to die.‖). 
130 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 106, at 1729-30 (―[T]he 
fashion community converges on seasonal themes, which fashion firms exploit by copying 
from one another, spinning out derivatives and variations, diffusing the themes widely, and 
finally, driving them toward exhaustion.‖). 
131 Id. at 1722 (―IP rules providing for free appropriation of fashion designs accelerate 
the diffusion of designs and styles.  We call this process ―induced obsolescence.‖); see, e.g., 
Hal R. Varian, Why That Hoodie Your Son Wears Isn’t Trademarked, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2007, at C3 (―If a particular style catches on, it is quickly copied.  Skinny jeans have been 
fashionable for the last few years, but there are signs that the trends are now moving toward 
straight-leg designs.  If the tide changes, pretty soon everybody will be selling straight-leg 
jeans.‖). 
132 Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 106, at 1722 (emphasis 
added). 
21
Heyison: If It's Not Ripped, Why Sew It?
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
276 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
creased diffusion, turnover, and sales133 for the economy and for the 
high-end designers who complain about the limited intellectual prop-
erty protections available to them. 
Tied in with the idea of a rapidly revolving cyclical fashion 
cycle is the concept that Raustiala and Sprigman call ―anchoring.‖134  
Anchoring follows the logic that in order for a trend to wear out it 
must first become a trend.135  In order for a look to become a trend 
there must be ―multiple actors converging on a particular theme.‖136  
This becomes possible as a result of limited intellectual property pro-
tections allowing designers to copy each other, thus enabling multiple 
actors to contribute to the emergence of a trend.  Without the ability 
of designers to copy, a trend would never occur because one designer 
cannot single handedly create a trend.  The cycle created due to in-
duced obsolescence would occur extremely slowly, if at all, hurting 
the economy and the fashion industry as a whole. 
B. Knock-offs Do Not Harm the High-End Designers: 
The Knock-off Shopper is Not the Gucci Customer 
Low intellectual property protections are desirable for the in-
dustry because they allow the cycle to move more rapidly, thus 
putting more money into the economy and designers‘ pockets.  The 
limited intellectual property protections which allow for design copy-
ing to take place, at the very least, do not harm the high-end design-
ers who ―come up with the most original and innovative idea,‖ the 
―one of a kind‖ idea which inspires the copy-cat designers (a senti-
ment which will be addressed later in this paper).  Tom Ford, former 
Gucci designer, in a recent interview, said it best: ― ‗We found that 
the counterfeit customer was not our customer.‘ ‖137  This simple 
statement makes perfect sense and is equally true about the knock-off 
consumer.  The high-end designers appeal to and market to a differ-
ent demographic of people than the low-end designers.  Most con-
sumers of the high-end designer‘s fashion designs would not be satis-
 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 1728. 
135 Id. at 1728-29. 
136 Id. at 1729. 
137 Adriana Rivera, The Culture of Copying, LIMCOLLEGE (Aug. 6, 2010), 
http://www.limcollege.edu/about-lim/8609.aspx. 
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fied with a knock-off138 and would not need to purchase the knock-
off because they have the means to buy the higher-quality designer 
good.  By appealing to only the demographic who can actually afford 
their designs, the high-end designers keep their appeal as status-
conferring designers and do not lose money because their clientele is 
not the clientele who would buy a knock-off.  Essentially, the copy-
cat designers help accentuate the superior status of the high-end de-
signers allowing them to maintain their elite status of catering only to 
those who can afford it.  Moreover, the ―knock-off‖ designers do not 
harm their bottom line in the least because the high-end designers ap-
peal to and target a different demographic. 
C. A Class Divide the Size of Macy’s in Herald Square 
Perhaps the most devastating effect which would arise from 
increased intellectual property protections would be the effect on the 
separation of classes.  Due to ―induced obsolescence‖ and ―anchor-
ing,‖ which increase the speed of the fashion cycle, trends and       
designs which are accessible to all walks of life fade in and out.  
Once an item becomes widely ―knocked-off,‖ and in turn no longer 
reflects the status symbol it once did, the trend fades and a new trend 
takes its place.  However, what would happen if the high-end design-
er could not be ―knocked-off?‖  Clearly, as far as the industry is con-
cerned, it and the high end designer would be harmed.  However, in a 
world in which only those with the means to purchase the high-end 
designer‘s goods can wear them and with no knock-offs to keep up 
with the trend for those without designer budgets, the division be-
tween the upper class and the middle to lower class will be great and 
devastating. 
It is well established that clothing is a positional and status-
conferring good.139  Knock-offs allow those without the means to 
purchase high-end goods to compete with those who do.  ―Consumers 
benefit enormously from the fashion industry‘s freedom to copy[.]  
Because of copying, the latest styles are not restricted to the wealthy–
 
138 Id. (―Since pretty much all fashionistas can easily spot a counterfeit design, Ford 
may have found a business reason that knock-offs are not a great threat.  He sells to a 
different demographic than the one that would be satisfied with a knock-off.‖). 
139 See Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 106, at 1718. 
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indeed, copying has played a major role in democratizing fashion.‖140  
Because of copy-cat designs, the lower and middle classes are able to 
compete more effectively with the upper class for jobs, schools, part-
ners, and most importantly respect.141  In an online article, ―Class De-
fines and Divides,‖ Tauren Dyson talks about the effect that clothing 
has on the way a person is perceived in the community.142  While 
speaking to students at the District of Columbia‘s Howard University, 
he found that it is routine to see ―students walk around with expen-
sive designer clothing‖ and that those students who can afford to live 
among the ranks who don designer clothing feel a stark difference be-
tween themselves and the ―locals‖ who cannot spend the money on 
clothes.  The ―haves‖ claim they avoid the ―have-nots‖ ―for fear of 
what they describe as the area‘s reputation for crime.‖143 
Additionally, clothing has the ability to influence self-
perception and confidence, which should not be limited to only those 
who can afford the high-priced, high-end designers‘ lines.  Fashion 
can make all the difference in the way individuals present them-
selves.  There is no doubt that people feels more attractive in a fa-
shionable outfit.  It is the way that clothing makes people feel on the 
inside that strikingly influences their external appearance.  Without 
the ability to experience those feelings, individuals will be at a se-
rious disadvantage in a society that places a heavy emphasis on pres-
entation. 
D. Black Market Fashion: It Does Not Look like 
Couture Coming Out of a Garbage Bag in 
Chinatown 
Given the importance of the universal need to stay in fashion, 
it is easy to see that should knock-offs become illegal, people will 
continue to produce such goods just as they do counterfeit goods.  
 
140 Kal Raustiala & Chris Sprigman, Should Fashion Be Protected by Copyright Laws? 
A Guest Post, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 12, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/ 
2010/03/12/should-fashion-be-protected-by-copyright-laws-a-guest-post. 
141 See generally Kadence Buchanan, The Social Effect of Clothing, EZINEARTICLES 
(Oct. 3, 2006) http://ezinearticles.com/?The-Social-Effect-of-Clothing&id=316724. 
142 Tauren Dyson, Class Defines and Divides: Divided and Defined by Class, DC 
INTERSECTIONS, http://www.dcintersections.americanobserver.net/category/dc-metro-area/ 
class-defines-and-divides (last visited Feb. 6, 2011). 
143 Id. (― ‗The thing is about Howard, it‘s like, you‘re so comfortable around black 
people, but then again, you realize sometimes when you go out that you really aren‘t 
comfortable around black people that are not [dressed] like you. ‘ ‖). 
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Knock-offs, unlike counterfeit goods, are essential for our society.  
But should knock-offs become illegal, they will continue to be repro-
duced and sold on the black market in the same manner as counterfeit 
goods. 
All one needs to do is take a walk down to Canal Street in 
New York City and look around to know that just because something 
is illegal to make or sell does not mean it will not be made or sold.  
Canal Street is the epicenter for the sale of counterfeit goods in New 
York City.144  Hundreds of adamant sellers are willing to take you in-
to a back alley whispering over and over, ―You want a Louis Vuitton 
or a Chanel for thirty dollars?‖  The United States loses an estimated 
$200 billion dollars a year due to the sale of counterfeit goods, and 
this figure might in actuality be well below the genuine amount lost 
due to the sale of counterfeit goods.145  This exceedingly high number 
would with certainty increase substantially should the sale of knock-
offs be amalgamated within this category. 
Not only will making knock-offs illegal have little to no effect 
on the availability of them, but black market fashion carries with it 
risks that the country should not be willing to take.  First, John Cas-
sillo, who manages Louis Vuitton‘s anti-counterfeiting enforcement 
for North America, stated that ―ninety percent of Louis Vuitton and 
other counterfeits originate in Asia, with counterfeiters having strong 
ties to organized crime and human trafficking.‖146  Second, in addi-
tion to the fact that it would not be young, hip, up-and-coming copy-
cat designers creating knock-offs for us anymore, the sale of counter-
 
144 See Andrea Sachs, School of Hard Knock-Offs, THE WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at 
P02. 
145 See Gene Quinn, Counterfeiting Costs US Businesses $200 Billion Dollars 
Annually, IPWATCHDOG (Aug. 30, 2010, 9:43 PM), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/08/30/ 
counterfeiting-costs-us-businesses/id=12336. 
The OECD draft report goes on to explain that based on best esti-
mates that international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods could well 
have accounted for up to . . . $200 billion in 2005, but that figure does 
not tell the entire story.  This $200 billion figure does not include coun-
terfeit and pirated products that are produced and consumed domestical-
ly, nor does it include the significant volume of pirated digital products 
distributed via the Internet. . . . The OECD draft report also explains that 
the scope of products being counterfeited and pirated is expanding, mak-
ing a shift from luxury goods to common products.  Given the notorious-
ly low quality of counterfeit products there is a growing health and safe-
ty risk associated with substandard counterfeit products. 
Id. 
146 Nicole Giambarrese, The Look For Less: A Survey of Intellectual Property 
Protection in the Fashion Industry, 26 TOURO L. REV. 243, 279 (2010). 
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feit goods are not reinvested into the U.S. economy.147  ―There is 
strong evidence that the 1993 World Trade Center attack was fi-
nanced through the sale of counterfeit t-shirts.‖148  Without question, 
Americans should prefer that the money go into their own country‘s 
economy, rather than take the very real risk that it could be tied into 
terrorism or the trafficking of children.  While legal knock-offs are 
good for the U.S. economy, illegal knock-offs would have a devastat-
ing effect on society, and the threat is very real because it has been 
seen before in relation to counterfeit goods.149 
E. Is it Even Possible to be Original? 
Diane Von Furstenberg is a very influential high-end designer 
and one of the most vocal supporters of increasing intellectual prop-
erty protections in the fashion industry.150  She wants to stop designer 
knock-offs through increased protection which the IDPPPA would 
offer.151  She argues that all designers should be original and innova-
tive.152  This begs the question though, is any fashion design really 
capable of being truly an original?  In her blog, fashion attorney Staci 
Riordan notes that even the most vocal supporter of the IDPPPA may 
not be a true originator.153  Diane Von Furstenberg claims to have in-
vented the wrap dress, but even ―fashion history students know that 
McCardell introduced the wrap dress in the 1940‘s.‖154  One can only 
imagine where the famous, successful, and admired Diane Von Furs-
tenberg‘s career might be if she were not allowed to be ―inspired‖ be-
cause of rigid intellectual property laws and if a judge found that her 
wrap dress was ―substantially similar‖ to McCardell‘s. 
 
147 See id. at 281-82. 
148 Id. at 281. 
149 Id. at 281-82. 
150 See Jackson, supra note 119. 
151 See id. 
152 See Chelsea Burnside, Copyright Debate Heats Up in Fashion Industry; Small 
Labels Would Be the Likely Losers Under Proposed Laws, Powerless Against Plagiarism, 
VANCOUVER SUN (CANADA), June 28, 2011, at F2. 
153 Riordan, supra note 88. 
154 Id. 
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V. OTHER INDUSTRIES WHICH CONTINUE TO THRIVE DESPITE 
A “LACK OF” PROTECTION AND WHY IT LOOKS GOOD ON 
THEM 
The fashion industry is often criticized as being one of the on-
ly creative industries which is not afforded adequate intellectual 
property protections.155  However, it is clear that other sectors of in-
dustry are not protected heavily by intellectual property law.  For ex-
ample, recipes, furniture design, tattoo design, computer databases, 
hairstyles, scents, open source software, and automobiles receive li-
mited intellectual property protection.156  Raustiala and Sprigman 
concluded, based on an analysis of the success of these industries, 
that perhaps it is the scant IP protection that contributes to their suc-
cess: 
From the perspective of most people interested in IP, 
industries that IP does not reach, or that have con-
tracted out of IP, do not seem very interesting.  But 
that view mistakes the means for the end.  The means 
is IP, whereas the end is innovation.  Innovation oc-
curring over long periods of time, in the absence of the 
legal rules that are conventionally said to be innova-
tion‘s necessary predicate, should command our atten-
tion.  The lack of protection in some of these areas 
may be explicable as resulting from their nature as ne-
cessities: we all need clothes, haircuts, furniture, and 
food, and indeed the useful articles doctrine is aimed 
at ensuring that useful things are excised from copy-
right‘s domain.  Regardless, the fact that innovation 
continues apace in these areas that fall outside the 
reach of IP suggests that the connection drawn by the 
orthodox account between IP rules and innovation is 
less strong and direct than commonly believed.157 
 
 
In a recent conference on creativity and ownership, Johanna 
 
155 See generally Raustiala & Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox, supra note 106. 
156 Id. at 1767-75. 
157 Id. at 1774-75. 
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Blakely, a leading blogger about fashion law, agreed.158  She created 
a chart comparing the gross sales of those industries which do receive 
heavy intellectual property protection versus those which do not.159  
The chart clearly demonstrates that industries such as food, automo-
biles, furniture, and fashion have sales which significantly tower over 
heavily-protected industries such as music, movies, and books.160  
This is yet another argument for the fact that the fashion industry and 
designers are doing just fine and are not alone in their limited protec-
tion. 
VI. CONCLUSION: ENHANCED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTION FOR FASHION IS NOT THE NEW BLACK 
The purpose of intellectual property law is to encourage inno-
vation among creators by protecting the expression of their ideas and 
giving them property rights in what they produce.161  The current 
state of intellectual property protection in the fashion industry in the 
United States has allowed designers to be creative and innovative in 
their designs despite their inability to protect the entire design.  Nev-
ertheless, the industry has continued to thrive and grow, proving that 
additional intellectual property protections are unnecessary for the 
industry‘s continued success. 
Intellectual property protection in the fashion industry should 
not be expanded to protect fashion designs any more than they cur-
rently do.  Expanding protection would have devastating effects on 
this country‘s economy, the industry as a whole, the designer‘s pock-
ets, other countries, and most notably and visibly, society.  The pro-
posed IDPPPA, despite having the intention to foster the growth of 
the fashion industry, would have the opposite effect and substantially 
harm it.  As such, the IDPPPA should be rejected.  Supporters of the 
Bill, who are mostly high-end designers, would be in for a rude awa-
kening should the Bill be passed.162 
Fashion is a growing and thriving industry that has become a 
powerhouse in the United States despite its limited protection and the 
 
158 Johanna Blakely, Address at the Lear Center‘s Creativity, Commerce & 
Culture Project Convention: Lessons from Fashion‘s Free Culture (July 30, 2008), available 
at http://www.learcenter.org/html/projects/?cm=ccc/fashion. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 GOLDSTEIN & REESE, supra note 2, at 17. 
162 See Jackson, supra note 119. 
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desultory economy.  Should designers choose to safeguard aspects of 
their designs, however, they may seek patent, trademark, or trade 
dress protection, which might just take a little creativity, originality, 
and innovation on their part.  After all, is it not creativity, originality, 
and innovation that the designers in support of the IDPPPA claim to 
possess? 
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